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RECONCEPTUALISING SHAREHOLDER REMEDIES TO MITIGATE THE 
PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE OVERLAP BETWEEN SECTION 994 AND 
PART 11 COMPANIES ACT 2006 
Shenara Perera* 
Abstract: The contemporary paradigm relating to shareholder remedies under English 
company law identifies a fundamental overlap between the Section 994 and Part 11 of 
the Companies Act 2006. The underlying cause of the overlap is that an alleged breach 
of directors’ duties can establish a claim under both remedial jurisdictions. This article 
argues the overlap between the jurisdictions generates three undesirable consequences. 
First, shareholders have used s.994 to obtain personal relief on a corporate claim, as 
opposed to pursuing a derivative claim for corporate relief. Second, s.994 has been used 
to obtain corporate relief on a corporate claim, instead of bringing a derivative claim. 
Third, shareholders can exploit s.994 to obtain an order authorising a derivative claim, 
effectively circumventing the threshold test in Pt 11. The article explores the 
undesirable impact of these consequences for English company law. In each case, the 
article recommends three reform proposals which, if implemented, would 
reconceptualise shareholder remedies under English company law and mitigate the 
problems caused by the overlap between s.994 and Pt 11. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Fundamental to the concept of shareholder remedies under English company law is the 
phenomenon that ‘directors owe their fiduciary duties to the company; not to the 
shareholders’.1 The phenomenon leads to the inference that breaches of directors’ duties 
are wrongs committed against the company, in respect of which the company may 
commence a claim against the directors for corporate redress, by applying the proper 
plaintiff rule in Foss v Harbottle.2 Alternatively, a shareholder can commence a 
derivative claim to obtain redress for the company under Part 11 of the Companies Act 
2006 (CA 2006).3 In respect of personal wrongs, a shareholder can rely on the unfair 
prejudice remedy under Section 994(1) CA 2006,4 to obtain personal, but not corporate, 
relief.5 In the event a petitioner seeks personal relief for a corporate loss, the court must, 
ideally, strike out the claim as contrary to the ‘no reflective loss’ rule.6  
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1 Companies Act 2006, s 170(1) (CA 2006); Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421. 
2 (1843) 67 ER 189, (1843) 2 Hare 461. Refer section B(1) for a brief account of the rule. 
3 Refer section B(2) for a brief account of the remedy. 
4 Refer section B(3) for a brief account of the remedy. 
5 Jennifer Payne, ‘Shareholders' Remedies Reassessed’ (2004) 67(3) Modern Law Review 500. 
6 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No.2) [1982] Ch 204, [1982] 1 All ER 366-
367. Refer section B(4) for a brief account of the rule. 
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 The conventional paradigm that corporate claims are inherently within the ambit 
of the derivative jurisdiction and that s.994 is a personal remedy for shareholders’ 
personal claims, has been a subject of significant ambiguity.7 The contemporary 
paradigm relating to shareholder remedies identifies a fundamental ‘overlap’ between 
the s.994 and derivative claims jurisdictions. The underlying cause of the overlap is that 
‘an alleged breach of directors’ duties can establish a claim under both remedial 
jurisdictions’.8 Therefore, the present article focuses on the debate on ‘directors as 
wrongdoers’, as opposed to third parties such as solicitors. Although a breach of 
directors’ duties owed to the company is primarily a wrong done to the company, 
shareholders can assert that such a breach is ‘conduct which is unfairly prejudicial to 
the interests of the members generally’.9 There is an extensive list of cases exhibiting 
courts’ acceptance that breaches of directors’ duties can establish a claim under s.994.10 
Therefore, the article does not expand on the cause of the overlap.11  
 Rather, there are two primary objectives of the article. Firstly, I seek to signify 
that the overlap between the two remedial jurisdictions generates the following three 
undesirable consequences. A) Shareholders have used s.994 to obtain personal relief on 
a corporate claim, as opposed to pursuing a derivative claim for corporate relief.12 B) 
S.994 has been employed to obtain corporate relief on a corporate claim, instead of 
bringing a derivative claim.13 C) Shareholders can exploit s.994 to obtain an order 
authorising a derivative claim, effectively circumventing the threshold test in Pt 11 CA 
2006.14 Secondly, in each case, I recommend three reform proposals that aim to mitigate 
the problems caused by the overlap between s.994 and Pt 11 CA 2006. Subsection 1 
presents a summary of the three undesirable consequences and the reform proposals. 
                                                          
7 Andy Gray, ‘The Statutory Derivative Claim: An outmoded superfluousness?’ (2012) Company Lawyer 
33(10) 296. 
8 Charnley Davies Ltd (No. 2), Re [1990] BCC 625. 
9 Lowe v Fahey [1996] 1 BCLC 262; Little Olympian Each-Ways Ltd (No.3), Re [1995] 1 BCLC 636; 
Allmark v Burnham [2005] 2 BCLC 437; Brenfield Squash Racquets Club Ltd, Re [1996] 2 BCLC 184; 
Lloyd v Casey [2002] 1 BCLC 454; Dalby v Bodilly [2005] BCC 627.  
10 Re Cumuana Ltd [1986] BCLC 430; Grace Biagioli [2006] BCLC 70; Re McCarthy Surfacing Ltd 
[2009] 1 BCLC 622; Tobian Properties Ltd, Re Attwood v Maidment [2012] EWCA Civ 998, [2013] 2 
BCLC 567. 
11 That is, the same facts can give rise to two legal dimensions. 
12 Atlasview Ltd v Brightview Ltd [2004] EWHC 1056 (Ch), [2004] BCC 542. 
13 Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2003] 2 BCLC 393; Anderson v Hogg [2002] BCC 923; 
Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] EWCA Civ 424, 2 BCLC 241; Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners 
Ltd [2008] 1 BCLC 468 PC (Jersey). 
14 CA 2006, s.996(2)(c). 
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 The remainder of the article is presented in four parts. Section B provides a 
summary of the core concepts and laws that underpin the research topic. Section C 
conducts a detailed case analysis to critically evaluate the impacts of utilising s.994 to 
obtain personal relief on a corporate claim and concludes by forwarding a mitigating 
solution to the issue. Section D deals with the concerns raised when utilising s.994 to 
obtain corporate relief on a corporate claim and concludes by recommending a 
workable legal framework to apply in those circumstances. Section E aims to signify 
the difficulties that arise as a result of utilising s.994 to authorise a derivative claim and 
concludes by providing a middle-ground solution to mitigate the adverse impacts.  
1. The Three Undesirable Consequences: A Summary 
The first undesirable consequence generated by the overlap is the use of s.994 to seek 
personal relief on a corporate claim. This leads to the following predicaments. Firstly, 
where the court discards the ‘no reflective loss’ rule and orders personal relief to redress 
a corporate wrong, the shareholder obtains double recovery against the wrongdoing 
director.15 Secondly, ordering a personal remedy against the director in breach may 
consequently reduce the value of the company’s claim against the director.16 Thirdly, 
the proper plaintiff rule in Foss is discarded where the court allows the shareholder to 
petition for a corporate wrong. As a result, the ‘separate legal entity’ status of the 
company is undermined because the remedy for the corporate loss is directed towards 
a shareholder and not towards the company.17 Fourthly, where the shareholder opts for 
a personal remedy, and there is no claim commenced by or on behalf of the company, 
the law fails to cure the loss endured by the company.  
 Consequently, to fully recover the loss sustained by the company, each 
shareholder would have to bring similar personal claims for the same corporate wrong, 
leading to an inefficient multiplicity of litigation, being costlier than if the court 
required a derivative action to be commenced.18 Moreover, where shareholders lack the 
resources to bring personal claims, justice for the corporate wrong will be denied 
altogether. Lastly, and most importantly, the article argues that in circumstances where 
the company is in the vicinity of insolvency, ordering personal relief for a corporate 
                                                          
15 Jennifer Payne, ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in flux: the future of shareholder protection’ 
(2005) 64(3) C.L.J. 647, 668. 
16 Han-Christoph Hirt, ‘In What Circumstances Should Breaches of Directors’ Duties Give Rise to a 
Remedy under ss.459–61 of the Companies Act 1985?’ (2003) 24(4) The Company Lawyer 100, 109. 
17 CA 2006, s 16. 
18 Brenda Hannigan, ‘Drawing boundaries between derivative claims and unfairly prejudicial petitions’ 
(2009) 6 JBL 606, 616. 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
4 
wrong will directly and adversely affect the creditors' interests.19 To temper these 
adverse effects the article proposes an authoritative framework which uses the concept 
of ‘reflective loss’ as the underlying principle when dealing with petitions requesting 
personal relief on a corporate claim. In essence, the article submits that where the loss 
sustained is classified as a ‘mere personal loss’ the courts must require the petitioner to 
bring a derivative claim (as the ‘personal loss’ is ‘reflective of the loss endured by the 
company’ and redressing the company would redress the shareholder). If a shareholder 
seeks to secure a personal remedy based on a corporate claim, then he or she must 
successfully corroborate that the loss is ‘separate and distinct’ from the loss sustained 
by the company.20  
 The second undesirable consequence generated by the overlap – that is, the use 
of s.994 to seek corporate relief on a corporate claim – raises the following concerns. 
Firstly, it effectively undermines the sound policy underpinning the rule in Foss that 
‘companies are collective associations’ and therefore the ‘decision of whether or not to 
litigate in respect of wrongs done to the company should be left to the majority’.21 
Secondly, the article argues that allowing shareholders to obtain corporate relief via a 
petition is a regressive step as it will risk rendering the derivative action obsolete.22 
Moreover, the article submits that the courts, by ordering corporate relief under s.994 
have opened the floodgates to increased litigation by shareholders and intensified the 
risk of abuse of process. With the aim of mitigating these adverse impacts, the article 
puts forward a workable legal framework to apply when the issue of ordering corporate 
relief on a petition comes before the court. The framework requires the court to 
ascertain whether the alleged breach of duty is a ‘misconduct’ or a ‘mismanagement’.23 
The article submits that a petitioner can obtain corporate relief only in respect of 
mismanagement claims provided that the additional hurdle can be surpassed. The 
additional hurdle asserts that firstly, it must be possible to determine the value of the 
director’s liability at the pleading stage. Secondly, the relief to be ordered must 
                                                          
19 ibid 618; McAskill v Fulton (2014) WL 8106597 [45] (Norris J). 
20 Payne, ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 Influx’ (n 15) 674. 
21 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing 
the Framework’ (March 2000), [4.19], [4.67] (DTI: Developing the Framework). 
22 Brian Cheffins, 'Reforming the Derivative Action: The Canadian Experience and British Prospects’ 
(1997) 1(2) CfiLR 259. 
23 Charnley (n 8) 783. 
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correspond with the redress that the company could have secured had it sued or if a 
derivative claim was established.24 
 The third undesirable consequence generated by the overlap is the use of s.994 
to obtain an order authorising a derivative claim. This practice raises the fundamental 
issue of creating two different threshold tests to bring a derivative claim.25 Simply, the 
threshold test under Pt 11 CA 2006 contains two permission stages which principally 
examine whether it is ‘in the interest of the company as a whole that the claim is 
pursued’.26 In apparent contrast to the position under Pt 11 CA 2006, the grounds on 
which derivative actions may be granted on petitions do not expressly include 
considerations relating to the company’s best interest. The Parliamentary intention 
behind placing the permission stages under Pt 11 CA 2006 was ‘to avoid opening a 
“Pandora's Box”27 to every disappointed shareholder’.28 The critical argument is that 
using s.994 to authorise a derivative claim defeats this intention of the Parliament. The 
subsequent argument is that the authorisation of a derivative claim under s.994 discards 
the principle of majority in Foss because an individual shareholder decides whether or 
not to litigate, not the company.29 As a mitigating solution, the article puts forward a 
reform proposal which aims to retain the s.994 jurisdiction to authorise derivative 
claims, with the additional requirement that the section is utilised more in line with the 
Pt 11 CA 2006 requirements.30 
 
B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND DEFINITIONS 
The section provides the information relating to the core concepts and laws that 
underpin the research topic. Subsection 1 explains the rule in Foss. Subsections 2 and 
3 present a brief account of the two remedial jurisdictions. Subsection 4 rationalises the 
‘no reflective loss’ rule.  
1. The Rule in Foss  
The rule in Foss enunciates two cardinal principles of company law. First, the proper 
plaintiff rule which articulates that ‘the proper plaintiff in respect of a wrong allegedly 
                                                          
24 Chime Corp, Re [2004] 7 HKCFAR 546 [62]. 
25 Ji Lian Yap, ‘Authorising derivative actions on unfair prejudice petitions’ (2011) 32(5) The Company 
Lawyer 150, 152. 
26 CA 2006, s 263(2)-(3). 
27 Julia Tang, ‘Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the Derivative Claim?’ (2012) 1(2) UCL Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence 181. 
28 HL Deb 9 May 2006, vol 681, col 885 (Lord Sharman). 
29 Gray (n 7) 299. 
30 Yap (n 25). 
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committed against the company, is prima facie the company’.31 The proper plaintiff 
rule upholds the Salomon principle: that ‘a company is an entity distinct from its 
members’.32 Second, the principle of majority rule means, ‘where the professed wrong 
is a transaction which can be made binding on the company by a simple majority of the 
members, no member is entitled to initiate a claim in respect of it’.33  
2. The Derivative Claims Jurisdiction  
The rule in Foss leads to the perception that corporate wrongs are inherently within the 
ambit of a derivative claim.34 To commence a derivative claim under the common law, 
a member had to surpass the ‘fraud on the minority’ and ‘wrongdoer control’ filters.35 
With the Company Law Review adopting the recommendation by the Law Commission 
in 1997 to codify the common law derivative action,36 the derivative claim framework 
was placed within Pt 11 CA 2006. As per the statutory procedure, ‘a shareholder can 
commence a derivative claim against any director in respect of negligence, default, 
breach of duty and breach of trust by a director of the company’.37 To ‘continue the 
claim’, Pt 11 CA 2006 asserts that ‘a shareholder must obtain the court’s permission in 
two stages’.38 At the first stage, the court must deny consent to continue the claim ‘if 
the supporting evidence filed by the applicant fails to disclose a prima facie case’.39 At 
the second stage, the court must consider a multiplicity of factors under ss. 263(2) and 
(3). Factors under s.263(2) are of a ‘mandatory nature’ thus obliging the court to dismiss 
the claim; factors under s.263(3) are ‘discretionary’. In sum, the factors that the court 
must consider relate to the principal question ‘whether it is in the interest of the 
company as a whole that the claim is pursued’. 
3. The Unfairly Prejudicial Remedy 
In the instance of the shareholder suffering a personal loss, redress to the shareholder 
is available via the unfair prejudice remedy under s.994(1) CA 2006. S.994 mirrors 
precisely the provisions formerly found in s.459 Companies 1985 Act as amended. 
                                                          
31 Foss (n 2). 
32 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, [1896] UKHL J1116-2. 
33 Foss (n 2); Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1066 (Jenkins LJ); Prudential (n 6) 357.  
34 Gray (n 7). 
35 Prudential (n 6) [366]; Smith v Croft (No.2) [1987] 3 All ER 945. 
36 DTI: Developing The Framework (n 20) [4.112]-[4.139]; DTI, ‘Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Final Report’ (July 2001) [7.46]-[7.51] (DTI: Final Report); Law Commission, 
Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, 1997) para 6.15; Poole and Roberts, ‘Shareholder Remedies 
Corporate Wrongs and the Derivative Action’ [1999] Journal of Business Law 99. 
37 CA 2006, s 260(3).  
38 CA 2006, s 261(1). 
39 CA 2006, s 261(2). 
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Under s.994 a shareholder can petition on the ground that ‘the company's affairs are 
being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of 
members generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself), or that 
an actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on 
its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial’. As the House of Lords (HL) in O'Neill v 
Phillips established,40 a claim of unfairness will only be successful ‘where there has 
been some breach of the terms on which the member agreed that the affairs of the 
company should be conducted; or some use of the rules in a manner which equity would 
regard as contrary to good faith’.41 Upon successfully founding a s.994 petition, 
s.996(1) provides the court has ‘a wide discretion’ to make an order ‘as it thinks fit’ to 
provide redress.  
4. The ‘No Reflective Loss’ Rule 
Linked to the rule in Foss is the ‘no reflective loss’ rule originating in Day v Cook,42 
which was judicially approved by the Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd 
v Newman Industries Ltd (No.2),43 and considered in detail by the HL in Johnson v 
Gore Wood.44 The ‘no reflective loss’ rule stipulates that ‘a personal claim by a 
shareholder in respect of the diminution in value of his shareholding as a result of a 
wrong done to the company is misconceived and should be struck out, for the 
shareholder's loss is merely reflective of the loss suffered by the company, and if the 
company enforces its full rights against the wrongdoer the affected stakeholders can 
recover the loss’.45 As long as ‘the company would ordinarily have a claim’, the 
shareholder cannot recover a loss, even if ‘the company declines or fails to sue’,46 
except ‘where the wrongdoer disables the company from pursuing the claim’- in which 
case, the shareholder can bring a claim for what is a ‘reflective loss’.47 Although the 
                                                          
40 [1999] 2 All ER 961, [1999] 2 BCLC 1.  
41 ibid [8]; Prentice and Payne, ‘Case Comment: Section 459 of the Companies Act 1984 - the House of 
Lords' view’ (1999) 115 LQR 587; Robert Goddard, ‘Case Comment: Taming the Unfair Prejudice 
Remedy: sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985 in the House of Lords’ [1999] C.L.J. 487; A J 
Boyle, ‘Case Comment: Unfair prejudice in the House of Lords’ (2000) 21(8) The Company Lawyer 
253. 
42 [2001] EWCA Civ 592, [2002] 1 BCLC 1 [15f]. 
43 Prudential (n 6).  
44 Johnson v Gore Wood [2002] 2 AC 1, [2001] 1 All ER 481. 
45 Prudential (n 6) 366-67. 
46 Johnson (n 44) [337f]-[338b] (Lord Bingham); Jonathan Mukwiri, ‘The No Reflective Loss Principle’ 
(2005) 26(10) The Company Lawyer 304, 305. 
47 Giles v Rhind [2002] EWCA Civ 1428, [2003] 1 BCLC 1 [34]; Hans-Christoph Hirt, ‘Companies in 
General’ (2003) JBL 420. 
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notion of ‘reflective loss’ can be critiqued,48 once it is accepted, it requires the court to 
refuse personal relief for corporate wrongs on the ground that ‘the proper plaintiff for 
the loss suffered is the company itself’.49  
 
C. S.994 PERSONAL RELIEF FOR A CORPORATE CLAIM 
The orthodox view holds that the rule in Foss and the ‘no reflective loss’ rule are the 
two main barriers to a corporate claim under s.994.50 Despite this ideal, ‘an activist 
judiciary’,51 and the ‘elastic quality’ of s.994,52 have led to litigants widely using s.994 
where wrongs are done to the company to obtain personal relief for claims which 
involve reflective loss.53 This section deals with the subject matter in three parts. 
Subsection 1 evaluates the judgment in Atlasview Ltd v Brightview Ltd.54 Subsection 2 
signifies the problematic consequences that follow when courts order personal relief for 
a corporate wrong under s.994. Subsection 3 proposes an authoritative framework in 
which, the concept of reflective loss plays a pivotal role in mitigating the problematic 
outcomes discussed in subsection 2. 
1. Personal Relief Under S.994 for Corporate Claims: A Case Analysis 
The wrongful conduct in Atlasview involved a breach of directors’ duties. The 
petitioners mounted the argument that such a breach is ‘conduct which is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of members generally’ and requested various remedies 
including damages.55 The defendants requested the court to strike out the petition based 
on two credible counterarguments. Primarily, the alleged breach was ‘not in respect of 
a duty owed to any shareholder’, but a ‘fiduciary duty owed to the company by 
directors’ and therefore the proper plaintiff is prima facie the company.56 Consequently, 
‘any diminution in the value of the petitioners' shares’ was ‘merely reflective of the 
company's loss’.57 The court rejected the defendants’ counterargument and accepted 
that a ‘breach of director’s duty is a typical case of conduct which is unfairly prejudicial 
                                                          
48 Charles Mitchell, ‘Shareholders' Claims for Reflective Loss’ (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 457. 
49 Payne, ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 Influx’ (n 15) 670. 
50 Refer text to (n 31), (n 33) in section B(1) and text to (n 45), (n 46) and (n 47) in section B(4). 
51 D Sugarman, ‘Reconceptualising Company Law: Reflections on the Law Commission’s Consultation 
Paper on Shareholder Remedies’ in Barry A.K. Rider (ed), The Corporate Dimension (Bristol: Jordans 
1998), 208. 
52 Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 404. 
53 Atlasview (n 12). 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid [18]-[21]. 
56 ibid [58]. 
57 ibid [58]. 
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to the interests of members generally’. Thereby, the court took the view that refusing to 
apply s.994 in such a case would ‘deprive the section of much of its value’.58  
 In the course of his judgment, Jonathan Crow relied on pre-Johnson59 cases such 
as Re A Company60 and Re Saul D Harrison,61 in which the courts ordered personal 
relief where a breach of directors’ duties has occurred without raising the reflective loss 
point.62 Indeed, it is logical to assume that those cases were decided in the ways they 
were because the reflective loss argument was not well founded.63 Nevertheless, the 
article submits that it is questionable whether the fact that an argument was ‘not raised 
in the past’ is a valid basis for the court to declare that the argument cannot succeed in 
the present case.64 More critically, the deputy judge’s excessive reliance on pre-Johnson 
authorities instead of applying the precedent set in Johnson is disconcerting especially 
when the HL had thoroughly deliberated on the profile of reflective loss in that case.65 
Furthermore, the deputy judge stated that Parliament changed the legislation ‘in order 
to allow unfair prejudice to the interests of the members generally to be included’. 
Perhaps, allowing the reflective loss argument to succeed can supersede the open-ended 
effect of the amendment.66 However, stripping the effects of the amendment does not 
interrupt the provision of justice for breaches of directors’ duties because there is a co-
existence of causes of action for both the company (as the proper plaintiff) and 
shareholders (by way of a derivative claim) to redress such corporate wrongs.67 
2. Personal Relief Under S.994 for Corporate Wrongs: The Predicaments 
Atlasview sets the precedent that personal relief for corporate wrongs is acceptable. This 
section identifies the difficulties that follow from the precedent in five ways. Firstly, 
where the court discards the ‘no reflective loss rule’ and orders personal relief to redress 
a corporate wrong, the shareholder obtains double recovery against the wrongdoing 
director. Jonathan Crow, mirroring Lord Millet’s view in Johnson,68 ascertains that 
where the shareholder seeks personal relief, the ‘reflective loss’ bar applies only when 
                                                          
58 ibid [61]. 
59 Johnson (n 44). 
60 Company (No.005287 of 1985), Re [1986] 2 All ER 253 (1985) 1 BCC 99586 [284D-H] (Hoffmann 
J). 
61 Re Saul D Harrison [1995] 1 BCLC 14 [18c–d] (Hoffmann J). 
62 Atlasview (n 12) [60]. 
63 ibid. 
64 Payne, ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 Influx’ (n 15) 669. 
65 ibid. 
66 Atlasview (n 12) [61]. 
67 Day (n 42) [15]; Gardner v Parker [2004] EWCA Civ 781 [34]. 
68 Johnson (n 44) [62]. 
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the issue of double recovery arises.69 The deputy judge claims that in order to avoid 
double recovery, the wrongdoer must compensate the company first and then purchase 
the shareholder's shares.70 Albeit the personal remedy sought under s.994 in Atlasview 
were damages, the most commonly requested remedy is a purchase order.71 Differing 
from the deputy judge’s view, Payne states, ‘in the instance where a breach causes loss 
to both the company and shareholder, double recovery against the director will be 
prevented only where redress is given to one victim at the expense of the other’.72 It is 
acknowledged that the advantage of making a purchase order in the context of a 
corporate wrong is that, the remedy in effect truncates two stages into one.73 Instead of 
obtaining corporate relief first and then selling the shares, the minority shareholder 
obtaining a purchase order can directly exit the company at the same value.74 However, 
agreeing with Payne, the article argues that, where the director compensates the 
company before purchasing the shareholder's shares, the shareholder obtains double 
recovery against the director as the valuation of shares at exit will include the 
compensation obtained by the company. Thus, the article submits that the courts must 
apply the ‘no reflective loss’ rule and deny personal relief for a corporate wrong in order 
to avoid the shareholder unjustly enriching himself by virtue of double recovery against 
the director.  
 Secondly, although a personal remedy does not adversely affect the company’s 
assets (as the remedy is against the directors in breach, not against the company), it can 
affect the director’s ability to meet subsequent claims, potentially reducing the value of 
the company’s cause of action against the directors.75 Thirdly, when courts discard the 
‘no reflective loss’ rule and allow shareholders to obtain personal relief on a corporate 
claim the proper plaintiff rule in Foss is discarded. Despite Jonathan Crow asserting 
that the ‘no reflective loss’ rule applies only when the issue of double recovery arises,76 
the article argues that ‘restraining the recovery of certain types of loss’77 is merely one 
facet of the rationale behind the ‘no reflective loss’ rule, not the sole rationale. Johnson 
indicates that ‘the fundamental issue for the operation of the no reflective loss rule is 
                                                          
69 Atlasview (n 12) [63] (Jonathan Crow). 
70 ibid. 
71 Hannigan (n 18) 615; Little Olympian Each Ways Ltd, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 636. 
72 Payne, ‘Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 Influx’ (n 15) 668. 
73 Hannigan (n 18) 616. 
74 ibid. 
75 Hirt (n 16) 109.  
76 Refer text to (n 69). 
77 Gardner v Parker [2004] EWCA Civ 781, [2005] BCC 46 [49] (Neuberger LJ). 
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whether the company has a cause of action’; if it does then ‘its claim will always trump 
that of the shareholder’.78 Thus, the ‘no reflective loss’ rule goes beyond the need to 
avoid double recovery and is ‘more rooted’ in the Foss rule and applies even if there is 
no risk of double recovery.79 Therefore, where the court disapplies the ‘no reflective 
loss’ rule when ordering a personal remedy to compensate a corporate loss, it discards 
the proper plaintiff rule in Foss. Consequently, the Salomon principle is undermined as 
the remedy for the wrong done to the company is not directed towards the injured party, 
namely, ‘the body corporate’.80 Thereby, the deputy judge appears to have appreciated 
one aspect of the rationale underlying the ‘no reflective loss rule’ while wholly ignoring 
the operating logic behind the rule, that an individual must not be recompensed for a 
loss sustained by another.81 
 Fourthly, the article argues that where the shareholder opts for a personal 
remedy to recover his fraction of the reflective loss,82 and there is no claim commenced 
by or on behalf of the company, the law fails to cure the loss endured by the company. 
To entirely recover the loss caused by the corporate wrong then, each shareholder must 
bring similar personal claims for the same corporate wrong to recover their fraction of 
reflective loss. The article disagrees with Jonathan Crow’s argument that ‘requiring the 
shareholder to follow the derivative action route at the end of s.994 is cumbersome’.83 
The article asserts that subsequent petitions by individual shareholders to recover their 
fraction of reflective loss would lead to an inconvenient and inefficient multiplicity of 
litigation in relation to the one wrong, proving to be costlier than if the court required a 
derivative action to be commenced.84 This outcome directly contradicts the aims of the 
Law Commission's ‘Shareholder Remedies Reform Proposal’ which sets out efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness as one of the six guiding principles in the consultation paper.85 
The problem of efficiency, however, may be resolved through case management and 
procedural rules promoting the consolidation of all shareholders as respondents to one 
                                                          
78 Johnson (n 44) [66]. 
79 ibid [65]-[68]; Day (n 42) [15]; Baring Plc v Cooper & Lybrand (No.1) [2002] 1 BCLC 364. 
80 CA 2006, s 16. 
81 Johnson (n 44) [36]. 
82 Hannigan (n 18) 616. 
83 Atlasview (n 12) [62]. 
84 Hannigan (n 18) 616.  
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petition.86 Nevertheless, in circumstances where shareholders lack the resources to 
bring a personal claim, justice for the corporate wrong will be denied altogether. 
 Lastly, the article raises the key concern that ‘depending on the company’s 
solvency’,87 the issue of creditor protection in the context of ordering personal relief for 
corporate wrongs is a serious concern.88 Creditor protection in circumstances where the 
company is solvent is not problematic as the creditors will continue to get paid 
ordinarily.89 If the company is insolvent, the creditors' interests will not be under threat 
from a petition, for the court simply would not make a purchase order where the essence 
of the allegations relate to breaches of directors' duties for that would clearly breach the 
order of distribution on insolvency.90 The concern arises where the company is in the 
vicinity of insolvency as ordering personal relief will directly and adversely affect the 
creditors' ability to recover the sums due to them.91 If the court adheres to proper 
practice, a derivative claim provides relief for the benefit of the company where its 
creditors have the foremost claim on its funds. In contrast, a purchase order ensures that 
the payment goes directly from the wrongdoer to the petitioner.92 Applying the 
precedent created in Atlasview in circumstances where the company is in danger of 
insolvency, entirely undermines creditors’ interests as ‘the money due to the company 
bypasses its coffers and goes straight into the shareholders' pockets instead’.93  
3. Proposed Solution: An Authoritative Framework   
Aiming to mitigate the predicaments in subsection 2, subsection 3 proposes an 
authoritative framework for the courts to apply in circumstances where a shareholder 
seeks personal relief for a corporate wrong. Step one involves the court determining in 
the preliminary hearing stage whether the director’s duty was owed to a) ‘the company 
alone’, b) ‘the shareholder alone’ or c) ‘both the company and the shareholder’. Where 
the director owes a duty to the ‘shareholder alone’, the position is clear: a claim for 
personal relief will be well justified. Where the court ascertains that the ‘director owes 
his duty to the company alone’, it must abide by the proper plaintiff rule and require 
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that ‘only the company may sue in respect of the loss sustained’.94 Alternatively, a 
derivative claim may lie under Pt 11 CA 2006.  
 The only exception to the blanket bar for ‘a personal claim by a shareholder in 
respect of a reflective loss’ lies where a ‘company sustains a loss but lacks a cause of 
action’.95 In those circumstances, a member of the company who has a cause of action 
can bring a claim to recover the loss regardless of whether the loss is a reduction in the 
value of the shareholding.96 The justification for allowing recovery in such 
circumstances is that the shareholder who exercises his cause of action against the 
director does not unjustly enrich himself at the expense of causing prejudice to the other 
members of the company. In effect, where the company lacks a cause of action, the 
shareholder’s action cannot reduce the company’s asset value.97 Thereby, the second 
predicament discussed in subsection 2, that a shareholder’s personal claim reduces the 
value of the company’s claim against the director, is discarded altogether.98 An example 
of an instance where ‘the company lacked a cause of action’ is perceived in Giles v 
Rhind.99 In that case, the breach of duty by the wrongdoer was so severe that it ‘disabled 
the company’ from continuing its cause of action as the company was unable to afford 
security for costs. The fact that the company decided not to claim against the defendant 
does not suffice.100 Additionally, a shareholder may be permitted to commence a claim 
to secure personal relief for a breach of directors’ duties where he successfully 
establishes that the loss claimed for is ‘separate and distinct’ from the loss endured by 
the company.101 In those circumstances, both the company and shareholder may recover 
only the loss sustained by them separately; neither must be allowed to recover losses 
endured by the other.102  
 In effect, step one mitigates the third predicament discussed in subsection 2 
regarding the rule in Foss and the Salomon principle because it firmly reasserts that the 
proper plaintiff in relation to a wrong done to the company is prima facie the company. 
In sum, step one allows a shareholder to maintain a claim for personal relief in relation 
to a corporate wrong in two circumstances. First, where the director’s duty is owed to 
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the company, but the ‘company lacks a cause of action’. Secondly, where the 
shareholder establishes that the loss is ‘separate and distinct’ from the company’s loss. 
In both circumstances, the shareholder is exercising his personal right to a claim and 
not assuming the right of the company to bring a claim. Although the task of 
ascertaining to whom the duty is owed may seem to be fairly straightforward, in 
practice, it is a difficult task, especially since the breach of directors’ duties may be 
construed as a wrong to the entity and the shareholder.103 Notwithstanding the difficulty 
involved in categorising the cases owing to the factual overlap, the article submits that 
the courts must ‘theoretically’ distinguish between a breach of duty owed to the 
‘company’ and the ‘shareholder’.104 If the courts ignore the ‘theoretical basis for the 
distinction’, then all claims by shareholders for infringement of their personal rights 
will also found a derivative action, a position which is unsustainable under company 
law.105 
 Where step one is surpassed, step two involves examining the nature of the loss 
sustained by the claimant. During the examination, the court must maintain the position 
that, as a fundamental rule, petitioners cannot recover reflective loss. The starting point 
lies in Lord Bingham’s formulation in Johnson.106 The court should ‘ascertain if the 
loss in question appears to be or is one which would be made good if the company had 
enforced its full rights against the director’.107 In effect, the test requires the court to 
determine whether the loss suffered is a ‘personal loss’ and not a ‘corporate loss’. The 
article proposes that where a loss is classified as a personal loss, the court must further 
determine if it is a ‘mere personal loss’ which translates into a reflective loss. 
Alternatively, the court must examine whether the personal loss is a loss ‘separate and 
distinct’ from the loss endured by the company.  
 The article submits that, where the loss in question involves a ‘diminution in the 
value of a petitioner’s shareholding’ caused by the breach of directors’ duties, the courts 
must classify such a loss as a ‘mere personal loss’ which translates into a reflective 
loss.108 The article focuses on the concept of ‘shares’ and ‘shareholding’ to arrive at 
this deduction. Unfortunately, the concept of ‘shares’ and ‘shareholding’ remain 
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inexact,109 and the precise ‘juridical nature’ of the ‘share’ is a burdensome 
examination.110 On the one hand, there is a school of thought led by Pennington which 
emphasises ‘a purely contractual definition of a share’.111 On the other hand, Gower 
and Davies forms a school of thought which takes the position that the rights conferred 
by shares are ‘not purely personal rights’. Instead, ‘some proprietary interest’ in the 
company is conferred upon the shareholder.112 This article supports the most practical 
view that ‘shares are recognised as the property of the shareholder’.113 The deduction 
extracted from the supported view is that ‘a diminution in value of the shares is a 
damage to the shareholder's personal property’ and therefore, is a personal loss.114 
Despite this conclusion, the important point as Lord Millett puts it is, ‘this personal loss 
is reflective of the company's loss; recovery of the loss by the company would redress 
the shareholder's loss’.115 Lord Millett’s position assumes that in private companies 
there exists a perfect positive correlation between ‘the diminution in the value of the 
company's assets’ and ‘the diminution in the value of the shares’.116 However, it is 
unclear if the correspondence is indeed exact. For example, the wrongdoing may 
negatively affect the ‘calculation of goodwill’ in the sense of the ‘the potential the 
business had’,117 which is a concept broader than is encompassed by future ‘revenue’ 
or ‘net profits’.118 However, quantifying losses in the sense of ‘the potential the business 
had’ is a vague task due to the uncertainties of the term ‘potential’. Therefore, the article 
maintains the stance that a claim for ‘diminution in value of the shares’ resulting from 
‘a breach of directors’ duties’ is a classic example of a ‘mere personal loss’ and must 
be struck out as contrary to the ‘no reflective loss’ rule. 
 An example of a loss that is ‘separate and distinct’ from a company’s loss was 
put forward by the court in the Prudential case. Where a director summons a meeting 
based on a fraudulent circular, shareholders can recover any loss personally suffered as 
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a consequence, which may include the expenditure incurred to attend the meeting.119 
Additionally, the company may claim for the loss it endures because of the directors' 
fraudulent conspiracy.120 Denying personal relief for ‘mere personal loss’ claims 
mitigates the first predicament regarding double recovery by the shareholder discussed 
in subsection 2 because the shareholder is barred from personally recovering the 
reflective loss.121 In conclusion, those shareholders who cannot establish a ‘separate 
and distinct’ loss, would have to follow the derivative action route to obtain relief.122 
On the outset, it may appear that requiring a shareholder to commence a derivative 
action is cumbersome. On balance, however, requiring shareholders to follow a 
derivative claim in circumstances where they cannot establish a ‘separate and distinct’ 
loss will mitigate the fourth and fifth predicaments discussed in subsection 2.123 In 
effect, a derivative claim will ensure the company is not denied redress for the wrong 
done to it and the creditors’ interest in circumstances where the company is potential of 
insolvency will be safeguarded. 
 
D. S.994 CORPORATE RELIEF FOR A CORPORATE CLAIM 
The conventional paradigm relating to shareholder remedies holds that corporate 
wrongs must be prosecuted for judgment through the derivative claim route.124 Contrary 
to the standard view, case law shows that where the alleged wrong is the breach of 
directors’ duties owed to the company (a classic corporate wrong), s.994 has been used 
to secure a remedy for the company.125 This consequence has triggered much academic 
debate.126 Shareholders employ s.994 in two ways to seek corporate redress. Firstly, 
they do so to obtain corporate relief.127 Second, they use the section to obtain the 
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authorisation of a derivative claim as the outcome of a petition.128 At this point, it is 
essential to distinguish between the two forms of corporate redress. Corporate relief 
provides a ‘definite and immediate recompense to the company’.129 By contrast, 
authorisation of a derivative claim ‘puts the company through litigation that consumes 
both time and resources’.130 In effect, there is no guarantee of success of the litigation 
or the scope of the remedy that the court may finally offer. This section anchors the 
debate on the second problematic outcome generated by the overlap between the two 
remedies, namely, the use of s.994 to obtain corporate relief. Subsection 1 puts forward 
four cases to illustrate that courts have exercised their discretion to order corporate 
relief as the outcome of a petition instead of requiring the commencement of a 
derivative claim. Subsection 2 evaluates the drawbacks and benefits of accepting the 
unorthodox approach. Acknowledging that the practical advantages ameliorate some of 
the drawbacks, subsection 3 proposes a mitigating solution in the form of a middle-
ground approach to the issue of ordering corporate relief under s.994. 
1. Corporate Relief Under S.994: Case Law 
In Clark v Cutland,131 the director in breach of his fiduciary duties owed to the 
company, misappropriated the company’s money. A derivative claim brought on behalf 
of the company for the recovery of the money was consolidated with the unfair 
prejudice petition.132 Interestingly, the order made on the petition was for the repayment 
of money to the company. Moreover, the court was willing to make a Wallersteiner 
order,133 requiring the company to indemnify the petitioner’s costs as would be the case 
in a derivative claim.134 The judgment in Cutland signifies two difficulties. First, the 
court unlocked the possibility for shareholders to indirectly enforce the company’s 
rights, undermining the rule in Foss.135 Second, the court’s willingness to make a 
Wallersteiner order inadvertently renders the petition as a superseding alternative to the 
derivative claim.136 The facts in Cutland are fundamentally similar to the facts in 
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Bhullar v Bhullar.137 In Bhullar, the directors had obtained property in conflict with the 
fiduciary duties they owed to the company as directors. The Court of Appeal ordered 
corporate relief under the petition. Similarly, in Anderson v Hogg,138 the court, (based 
on a claim under a petition), ordered the payment to the company of money improperly 
transferred to a director. In Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners,139 the Privy 
Council (PC) dealing with the Jersey statutory equivalent of ss.994-996,140 
contemplated on ‘the role of s.994 in respect of claims arising out of breaches of 
directors’ duties’. In Gamlestaden the PC did not grant corporate relief. However, the 
PC, applying the arguments made in the judgment of the Hong Kong Court of Final 
Appeal in Re Chime Corp Ltd,141 made the following clarifications: firstly, the unfair 
prejudice remedy can be used to ‘enforce a cause of action vested in the company, 
arising out of breaches of directors’ duties’; and secondly, the court could order that 
‘wrongdoing directors pay damages to the company’ in those circumstances.142 
 The judgment in Gamlestaden leads to the inference that the precedent in 
Cutland, as extrapolated in Bhullar, that the expansive scope of s.994 allows for claims 
of corporate relief, is the prevailing stance on the issue at hand.143 The article submits 
that, with the codification of the derivative action under Pt 11 CA 2006, ordering 
corporate relief on a s.994 petition as a matter of following the precedent laid by Arden 
L.J in Cutland is an erroneous application of the law. Cutland, Bhullar, Anderson and 
Gamlestaden all share the commonality that they are ‘pre-Pt 11 CA 2006’ cases.144 
Hannigan argues that as a result of this ‘commonality’ the petitioners in each case were, 
based on different grounds, precluded from commencing a derivative claim.145 
However, because the claims in each case required a remedy, the court proceeded to do 
so under the guise of s.994. Indeed, had Gamlestaden come before the court when Pt 
11 CA 2006 was in force, there is a plausible argument that the case would have 
advanced as a derivative claim because negligence can place such a claim under the 
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statutory footing.146 In respect of Bhullar and Anderson, Hannigan asserts that the two 
cases are evidently derivative actions, ‘in substance and outcome’ but proceeded 
improperly under a petition.147 Furthermore, the article asserts that Arden LJ in Cutland 
interprets the petition ‘expansively’ without providing reasons to interpret in such a 
way. Payne argues that, although Arden LJ’s judgment lacks reasoning, persuasive 
reasons are available for the decision.148 The article submits that automatically 
accrediting such reasoning to Arden LJ is conjectural and implausible.149 Thus, the 
article asserts that these cases may be viewed as ‘exceptional’ in nature and must not 
be viewed as the courts providing a ‘criteria for ordering corporate relief on a 
petition’.150 
2. Impact of Accepting the Unorthodox Approach 
The first argument against ordering corporate relief under s.994 is that it undermines 
the policy underpinning the rule in Foss. The underlying policy of the composite rule 
in Foss is sound. Viz., companies are ‘collective’ associations, and therefore ‘the 
decision of whether or not to litigate in respect of wrongs done to the company’ should 
be ‘left to the majority except where the wrongdoers are themselves in control’.151 As 
Gray argues, widening the scope of s.994 contradicts the policy underpinning the rule 
in Foss because the ‘decision to litigate’ is taken by an individual member, not the 
company.152 In discarding the proper plaintiff rule, the courts risk abandoning the 
foundational principle underpinning company law, that a company is a distinct legal 
entity.153 The codification of the derivative action under Pt 11 CA 2006 may suggest to 
some that the significance of the rule in Foss has faded. However, the authoritative 
stance is that the derivative action under the statutory footing further strengthens the 
rule in Foss. Parliament’s requirement that a shareholder must secure the court’s 
permission to continue a derivative action under Pt 11 CA 2006 acts as a hefty hurdle 
in the way of a claimant; thus, it protects the rule in Foss.154 More explicitly, the 
‘Explanatory Notes to the CA 2006’ read that the provisions in Pt 11 do not intend to 
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replace the rule in Foss.155 Therefore, in circumstances where the Parliament has 
reasserted the commitment to safeguard the rule in Foss, the courts’ acceptance of using 
s.994 to order corporate relief which openly undermines the rule in Foss, is puzzling.156  
 The second argument against ordering corporate relief under s.994 is that the 
courts risk rendering the derivative action obsolete, with s.994 destined to remain the 
‘remedy of choice among shareholders’.157 Section E(2) below conducts a detailed 
evaluation of the need to safeguard the derivative jurisdiction. However, for the purpose 
of this section, the article submits that rendering the derivative action obsolete is a 
regressive step. The article appreciates the view of academics that the derivative action 
is a mechanism that reduces agency costs of a company.158 The derivative actions assist 
in deterring directorial wrongdoing and help maintain investor confidence by providing 
an effective entry to the courts.159 Finally, the article argues that ordering corporate 
relief under s.994 is an unwelcome development for companies because, 
notwithstanding their ‘exceptional facts’,160 the outcomes of the cases discussed in 
subsection 1 can unlock floodgates to unwarranted litigation by minority shareholders 
and enhance the risk of abuse of process. 
 These shortcomings lead to the conclusion that the courts must abide by the 
orthodox derivative action approach to resolve corporate claims, rather than seeking 
equivalent relief through a more circuitous route.161 However, the practical advantages 
that follow from allowing shareholders to obtain corporate relief on a petition negate 
this conclusion. To put it simply, ordering corporate relief following a successful 
petition, instead of requiring the shareholder to commence a derivative action, prevents 
the unnecessary duplication of proceedings.162 Academics such as Cheung assert that 
ordering corporate relief directly under the petition is an eminently pragmatic and 
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sensible conclusion that will expedite matters and prove to be cost-effective.163 Thus, 
in subsection 3 the article aims to build in a proper mechanism for the court to follow 
when allowing a shareholder to indirectly enforce the company’s rights under s.994.164  
3. The Middle-Ground Solution 
The opening statement of this section is that the precedent in Cutland that allows the 
court to automatically order corporate relief upon establishing the criteria of the petition 
must be swept away. The article combines the findings from two cases to create a legal 
framework for the courts to follow in circumstances where a shareholder seeks to obtain 
‘corporate relief’ under the ‘petition’ in respect of ‘an infringement of the company’s 
rights’.165 The two cases significant to the legal framework are Charnley Davies166 and 
Chime Corp.167 The starting point lies in Lord Millett’s remarks (albeit obiter) in 
Charnley Davies.168 The case concerned ‘a petition under s.27 Insolvency Act 1986’, 
which mirrors the remedy under s.994, ‘for creditors and members in situations where 
an administration order is in force’. The first step obliges the court, at the ‘pleading 
stage’, to concentrate on what is ‘the whole gist of the complaint’.169 According to Lord 
Millett, the court must examine ‘the whole gist of the complaint’ to understand whether 
the unlawful conduct in question is, in essence, a ‘misconduct’ or a ‘mismanagement’. 
Simply described, ‘misconduct’ translates to ‘unlawful conduct such as a breach of 
duty’.170 ‘Mismanagement’ falls under a wider category of unlawful conduct which 
could consist of misconduct ‘in part but not in whole’.171  
 In the opinion of Lord Millett, where ‘the whole gist of the complaint’ represents 
misconduct alone, the case must be dealt with by a derivative action.172 Thus, where 
‘the whole gist of the complaint’ does not represent misconduct entirely but could 
include misconduct in part, the unlawful conduct can be ascertained as a 
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‘mismanagement’. Lord Millett states that a petition is justified where the claim 
involves loss sustained as a result of mismanagement by directors, but only to provide 
personal relief for the petitioner, not corporate relief for the company.173 According to 
his Lordship, ‘the distinction between misconduct and mismanagement does not lie in 
the particular acts or omissions of which the complaint is made, but in the nature of the 
complaint and the remedy necessary to meet it’.174 His Lordship's proposition is 
important because it recognises that there may be more than one legal dimension, either 
a derivative claim or a s.994 petition, to the same set of facts. Although the same set of 
facts can establish two separate remedial claims, Lord Millett asserts that ‘the nature of 
the complaint’ and ‘the appropriate relief’ are distinctive in the two instances.175  
 Upon categorising the unlawful conduct as either misconduct or 
mismanagement, the subsequent step involves utilising Lord Scott’s judgment in Chime 
Corp. The provision under consideration in the Hong Kong case Chime Corp mirrors 
s.994 in all relevant aspects, and the judgments of Justice Bohkary P.J. and Lord Scott 
(with whom the rest of the court agreed) entailed a complete review of the English 
authorities. In essence, Lord Scott endorses and builds upon Lord Millett’s distinction 
between ‘misconduct claims’ and ‘mismanagement claims’. In doing so, Lord Scott 
opined that the use of a petition ‘in order to circumvent the rule in Foss in a case where 
the nature of the complaint is misconduct rather than mismanagement is, an abuse of 
process’.176 Following Lord Scott’s judgment, upon categorising a claim as one of 
mismanagement, it is possible for the court to exercise their discretion and order 
corporate relief under the petition provided the following two hurdles be surpassed. 
Firstly, it must be possible to determine the quantity of the director’s liability at the 
pleading stage. 177 Secondly, the relief to be ordered must correspond with the redress 
which the company could have secured had it sued or if a derivative claim was 
established.178 Support for including the hurdle stage in the legal framework is found in 
Gower’s statement that ‘the decision of Lord Scott in Chime Corp is based on the 
correct principles and should be followed’.179 
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 While the legal framework appears imprecise, the article submits that it is 
evidently workable. Applying the framework to Anderson, Bhullar and Gamlestaden, 
it is clear that the whole gist of the complaints (breach of directors’ duties) was 
misconduct and therefore a derivative claim was the appropriate way forward.180 On 
the other hand, Cutland is an example of mismanagement, and in this case Lord Scott's 
criteria in Chime Corp come into play. Hannigan affirms that the question of whether 
the directors’ liability can be conveniently ascertained at the pleading stage in Cutland 
is straightforwardly answered. In effect, when assessing the conduct of the company’s 
affairs to establish a petition, the court in Cutland had to examine the ‘manner and 
circumstances in which the director had extracted money’ from the company.181 
Therefore, determining the value of the director’s liability upon quantifying the loss 
endured by the company at the pleading stage of the petition was a convenient task. In 
effect, the legal framework attempts to safeguard the rule in Foss by requiring claims 
involving misconduct and mismanagement claims that cannot surpass Lord Scott’s 
criteria to be resolved through a derivative action. Consequently, the derivative claims 
are not rendered obsolete. The need to surpass Lord Scott’s criteria of quantifying the 
directors’ liability at the pleading stage would negate the floodgate argument raised in 
subsection 2. Undoubtedly, however, a Supreme Court verdict on the debate would be 
a positive development.  
 
E. AUTHORISING A DERIVATIVE CLAIM VIA S.994 
In section D the article distinguished between the two forms of corporate redress sought 
by shareholders as the outcome of the petition.182 Section E aims to illustrate that the 
authorisation of a derivative claim as the outcome of a petition, is yet another 
undesirable consequence that stems from the overlap between the two remedial 
jurisdictions. In essence, where an alleged breach of directors’ duties forms the basis of 
a successful petition, s.996(2)(c) and s.260(2)(b) CA 2006 collaboratively provide that 
the court may exercise its discretion to authorise a derivative claim as the outcome of a 
petition. For example, in Shun Tak Holdings Ltd, Re,183 the remedy sought in an unfairly 
prejudicial petition brought under the unfair prejudice provisions in the Hong Kong 
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Companies Ordinance,184 included an order authorising a derivative claim against its 
directors for their alleged breaches of duty. In subsection 1 the article raises a grave 
policy concern to assert that the existence of two parallel regimes for authorising 
derivative actions is problematic. In subsection 2 the article critically evaluates two 
proposals to resolve the problems identified in subsection 1. Finally, with the objective 
of mitigating the problematic consequences of the overlap in context, subsection 3 puts 
forward a reform proposal that establishes a middle-ground solution. 
1. Authorising a Derivative Claim Through S.994: The Predicaments  
As section B(2) above illustrates, Pt 11 CA 2006 necessitates the shareholder to obtain 
the court’s permission in two stages to ‘continue’ a derivative action under the 2006 
Act.185 In sum, the principal question considered in the permission stages is ‘whether it 
is in the interest of the company as a whole that the claim is pursued’.186 In apparent 
contrast to the position under Pt 11 CA 2006, the grounds on which derivative actions 
may be authorised under the petition do not expressly include considerations relating to 
the company’s best interest. The over-arching consideration as stated in s.996(1) CA 
2006 is that the order should give relief for the unfairly prejudicial conduct in context.187 
Thus, when authorising a derivative action as the outcome of a petition, the court 
focuses not on the question whether the continuance of a derivative claim will promote 
the interest of the company, but whether it provides a remedy that relieves the 
prejudiced shareholder.188 Therefore, the two regimes have different threshold tests to 
obtain the authorisation of a derivative action.  
 The article concedes Kershaw’s argument that the ability to authorise a 
derivative action as the outcome of a petition is problematic because it effectively 
circumvents the hurdles that have been carefully crafted in Pt 11 CA 2006.189 The 
question then is, as Louis Doyle and MR Justice David Richards contend, whether the 
permission stages enacted by the Parliament in Pt 11 CA 2006 has any importance if 
petitioners are allowed to circumvent them by ‘getting around and in through the back 
door’?190 The article acknowledges that where a derivative action is authorised via 
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s.994, it effectively bypasses a ‘time consuming and expensive mini-trial’ at the 
permission stage.191 Moreover, Loughrey’s literature review on the issue at hand 
profoundly recognises Keay’s contention that the threshold to pass the ‘s.261(2)- prima 
facie case’ hurdle is to establish a more than a zero per cent chance.192 The article 
accredits Loughrey’s acknowledgment of Gibbs’ scepticism as to the significance of 
the first permission stage, because a ‘more than zero per cent’ threshold can easily be 
surpassed.193  
 Nevertheless, the article submits that the authorisation of a derivative action as 
the outcome of a petition defeats the policy reasons for establishing the permission 
stages in Pt 11 CA 2006 in the first place. The Parliament included the prima facie test 
in the statutory derivative procedure to ‘avoid opening floodgates to every disenchanted 
individual in the country’.194 In effect, Parliament required the courts to ‘filter out 
unmeritorious or flimsy claims without the participation of companies and at the earliest 
possible opportunity’.195 Franbar v Patel196 and Stimpson v Southern Landlords 
Association197 are classic examples of Parliament’s intention in placing the hurdles 
being rightly executed. In both cases, the courts exercised their discretion to refuse 
permission because the continuance of the claims was not actually ‘in the interests of 
the company’. Therefore, the article submits that the s.994 regime of authorising 
derivative actions which do not have a filtering stage would be a prima facie welcome 
development ‘only in a world where members never raise vexatious, wholly malicious 
or unmeritorious actions’.198   
 In addition to the policy argument, the article contends that the authorisation of 
a derivative claim under s.994 is also problematic because it discards the majority rule 
in Foss. Pt 11 CA 2006 and the Explanatory Notes to the CA 2006 safeguards the 
majority rule in Foss as ‘ratification or authorisation by the company of the conduct 
complained of’ is a bar to a derivative claim.199 In contrast, the court is not expressly 
required to consider issues of ratification or authorisation by the company when 
authorising a derivative claim under s.994. Therefore, in the absence of the permission 
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stages which consider the issues of ratification or authorisation, the majority rule in 
Foss is discarded under s.994 as under s.994 the petitioner decides ‘whether or not to 
litigate’, not the company.200  
2. Analysis of Two Possible Solutions  
In response to the policy concerns relating to different threshold tests and the disquiet 
of disregarding the majority rule in Foss (that arises where a derivative claim is 
authorised as the outcome of a petition), the article contemplates two solutions. The 
first solution is to abolish the court’s power under s.996(2)(c) CA 2006 to authorise a 
derivative claim as the outcome of a petition, effectively confining the derivative 
actions within Pt 11 CA 2006 jurisdiction. The second solution is to abolish the 
derivative claim jurisdiction under Pt 11 CA 2006, respecting s.994 as the equivalent 
alternative to the Pt 11 CA 2006 derivative jurisdiction. 
  The principal argument in respect of the first solution, viz., the removal of the 
power under s.996(2)(c) to authorise derivative claims as the outcome of a petition is 
that it will effectively streamline the framework of the CA 2006 as derivative actions 
will be covered exclusively in Pt 11.201 Consequently, the law relating to derivative 
claims would have greater certainty and it would reduce wasteful litigation. Moreover, 
the mandatory requirement that a petitioner under s.994 must prove that ‘unfairly 
prejudicial conduct has occurred’202 exceeds what is required of an orthodox derivative 
claimant. An orthodox derivative claimant simply needs to establish that a company has 
endured a loss as a result of a wrong complained of and that the pursuance of a claim 
in respect of that loss is ‘in the best interest of the company’. Posit a setting where the 
solution of abolishing the court’s power under s.996(2)(c) CA 2006 is implemented, 
then misfortunate outcomes of cases such as in Shun Tak, where claimants were 
informed after a time-consuming trial that they have pursued their claim on the wrong 
route,203 would be avoided altogether. Therefore, the article asserts that narrowing the 
scope of s.994 by removing the power to authorise derivative claims could feasibly 
result in the avoidance of lengthier and costlier proceedings.204 
 Despite these considerations, the article submits that, for the practical purpose 
of avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings, it is essential to retain the court's power under 
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s.996(2)(c). Retaining the power to authorise derivative claims would allow the courts 
to flexibly deal with circumstances where, for example, a derivative action is required 
to recompense the unfairly prejudicial treatment of the shareholder adequately.205 
Furthermore, the article contends that where a shareholder successfully proves the 
unfair prejudice and seeks a personal remedy such as a purchase order in addition to a 
derivative action order, it may be wasteful for a separate derivative application to be 
made under Pt 11 based on essentially the same facts.206 Where the second solution viz., 
the removal of the derivative claim jurisdiction under Pt 11 CA 2006 is concerned, the 
critical question is ‘whether the s.994 remedy provides for what the derivative claim 
seeks to in a more effective or theoretically sound manner?’207 As Robin Hollington 
QC states, a Wallersteiner indemnity for costs is a factor that allows derivative claims 
to supersede the petition in this context.208 However, with Cutland fastening the 
possibility of being awarded a ‘Wallersteiner indemnity for costs’ under s.994, the cost 
factor appears to be an inadequate argument to assert that the derivative jurisdiction 
supersedes the s.994 jurisdiction in this context.209 Nonetheless, the article submits that 
abolishing the statutory derivative action under Pt 11 CA 2006 would be an imprudent 
step because it completely discards the supposed ‘usefulness of the given laws’.210 This 
article summarises the ‘usefulness’ of a derivative action in four ways.  
 Firstly, as Reisberg suggests, the derivative claim is an affirmative ‘social 
force’, operating as a ‘powerful restraint’ to those directors lured to act unlawfully.211 
The same cannot be asserted regarding the unfair prejudice petition as the ‘scope of 
judicial oversight’ integral to the derivative claim is not found in a petition, meaning 
that under Pt 11 CA 2006 frivolous claims are dispensed at an early stage.212 Secondly, 
this article submits that derivative claims under Pt 11 CA 2006 act as a mechanism for 
warranting that justice is served to the company ‘holistically’, as opposed to simply 
upholding the petitioner’s interests.213 Thirdly, as Sykes argues, derivative claims under 
Pt 11 CA 2006 effectively empowers the shareholders as, under the newly codified 
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rules, shareholders can now bring a claim for mere negligence.214 Fourthly, Pt 11 CA 
2006 derivative regime allows the courts to reiterate the importance of the rule in 
Foss.215 Therefore, in the hypothetical circumstance where the derivative claim 
jurisdiction is removed, the courts in cases such as Shun Tak Holdings,216 would be 
compelled to produce an outcome disregarding the positive functionalities of assessing 
the claim involving breach of directors’ duties under the Pt 11 CA 2006 jurisdiction. 
Thus, it is essential to safeguard both regimes that enable a shareholder to commence a 
derivative claim. However, it is also important to mitigate the policy concerns arising 
out of different threshold tests and safeguard the majority rule in Foss. Thus, in 
subsection 3 the article provides a middle-ground solution to the debate at hand. 
3.  Conclusions  
The reform proposal requires the court to operate the s.994 regime in accordance with 
the laws governing the commencement and continuation of derivative claims under Pt 
11 CA 2006. In implementing this proposal, step one involves, upon founding the 
elements of s.994, assessing if the director’s unlawful conduct involves ‘negligence, 
default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of the company’.217 Step two 
requires the courts to deliberate over the position of the shareholders collectively prior 
to authorising a derivative claim under s.994.218 Therefore, the second stage proclaims 
the court must evaluate factors such as ‘authorisation or ratification’,219 the ‘importance 
that a member acting in conformity with s.172 (duty to promote the success of the 
company) would attach to the claim’,220 and the ‘views of the disinterested 
shareholders’.221 In effect, the court is required to consider ss.263(2), 263(3) and (4) 
CA 2006 to determine whether the continuance of the claim is ‘in the best interest of 
the company’. Safeguarding the company’s interest is particularly crucial as 
consequently, it protects the interests of creditors who have an imperative stake in the 
success of the company.222 To facilitate the consideration of these factors by the court, 
the article recommends that legislative amendments be made to enable the court to give 
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instructions as to the evidence that must be supplied by the petitioner, in a manner 
similar to s.261(3)(a).223  
 Under the proposed solution, the shareholder who seeks the remedy of a 
derivative action under a petition must establish an unfair prejudice as well as satisfy 
the substantive elements imported from Pt 11 as mentioned above. Thus, the solution 
makes it more onerous to obtain permission for a derivative action under the petition 
than under Pt 11 CA 2006. The Law Commission, examining cases reported in 
‘Butterworth’s Company Law Cases’ found that proceedings under s.994 are generally 
costly and lengthy in the measure of weeks rather than days.224 Therefore, when 
implementing the proposed solution, the cost and time factor may appear to be more 
inconvenient as the petitioner will have to establish both unfair prejudice and the Pt 11 
CA 2006 elements. However, the reform proposal, albeit being a roundabout way of 
obtaining justice, in effect reaches a middle-ground solution. On the one hand, it enables 
the court to flexibly deal with circumstances where a derivative action is necessary to 
redress the unfairly prejudiced shareholder. On the other hand, it solves the policy 
problems arising out of the different threshold tests as both the regimes will operate 
according to Pt 11 CA 2006 requirements and reinstates the rule in Foss as the court 
will examine issues of ratification and authorisation by the company. Streamlining the 
threshold tests allows the court to employ s.994 in a manner which protects the 
company from frivolous and unmeritorious claims.225 In conclusion, implementing the 
solution will, in sum, provide greater certainty, predictability and improved coherence 
within the framework of CA 2006.
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